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21) Introduction
A fundamental issue in political economy is the relationship between political
institutions and property rights. Historical studies providing analysis of this
relationship tend to focus on early modern Western countries. This paper considers
three major eras in ancient China, ancient Greece and ancient Rome. These cases have
received very little attention and comparisons among them are few. In the comparison
made here, a common feature of state formation is seen in all three cases.
In the ancient period, before states had contiguously divided up the continents,
states were essentially city states or tribes centered on a town or village. The authority
of the state did not extend much beyond the town itself. Although the data is
thousands of years old, we are compensated by the fact that back then society was
very simple compared to modern times. There are essentially only a handful of main
social groups in the ancient period. This makes identifying the relationship between
political institutions and property rights much easier. Fundamental changes and
development of political institutions most often takes place during increases in the
level of military threat. One of the most well known statements in political science is
one made by Charles Tilly:“War made the state, and the state made war.”1 In the case
of the ancient era an increase in the level of military threat often leads to state
formation, or to put it another way, changes in political institutions. These changes in
political institutions entail changes in the property right system. This is the
background and motivation for studying the ancient period.
This paper documents a particular aspect of state formation related to political
institutions and property rights. It is shown that property rights are extended to new
groups in exchange for support of a new ruling group and that the previous privileged
supporters resist this change. This is shown by comparing different cases of the state
formation process in ancient China, Greece and Rome.
Comparisons of the ancient period between the West and China are currently
becoming more popular. An important early contribution in this direction was Victoria
Tin-bor Hui’s War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe.2
The impact of this book on political science and sociology has been to help open the
doors to comparisons between ancient China and the West. There is a growing
literature that makes comparisons between ancient China and ancient Rome and/or
1 Tilly (1975), p. 73.
2 Hui (2005).
3ancient Greece.3 There is also a well established literature in sociology and political
science that makes numerous comparisons across countries which has touched on
these three ancient periods.4
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Some basic concepts used
in this paper are discussed in Section 2. Sections 3-5 cover ancient China, Greece and
Rome respectively and Section 6 concludes.
2) Basic concepts
Fundamental changes and development of political institutions most often takes place
during a period when the level of military threat is increasing. The basic reason for
this is that the foundation of the state is the authority it holds over society. Since the
state itself is an organized group of people, we are essentially talking about the
authority one group has over society. What does authority mean? It can only mean
that one group limits their resistance to the actions of the ruling group. That is to say
one consciously allows a group to perform certain actions that may reduce one’s
liberties. Here lies the heart of property rights –restrictions on one’s ability to use
one’s life and property to perform certain actions. The state may take some property
or income, but as long it is conceded that the state has the authority to do so,
individual and social resistance is reduced and the state successfully collects its taxes.
The authority of the state over society therefore puts various limits on different
groups’ability to resist its actions. The relationship between the state and various
social groups is the focus of this analysis. We will see that in the ancient era during
times when the military threat is increasing state formation takes place. In particular
the state or some other group will gain more authority in the sense that the effective
military force has increased so that it can defend better against the increased military
threat. This is accomplished by rearranging the various state-social group relations.
The end result is that the state receives a net increase is support. Some groups may
have their relations with the new state weakened while others will have theirs
strengthened. Those that have their relations with the state weakened will be hurt by
these changes because the nature of the relationship between the state and supporting
groups is that it involves an exchange of support for rights. If one’s support for the
3 See for example Kim (2009), Lloyd (1996), Martin (2010), Motomura (1991), Scheidel (2011) and
Shankman and Durrant (2002). A major player in this movement is The Stanford Ancient Chinese and
Mediterranean Empires Comparative History Project (ACME).
4 See Hintze (1975), Mann (1986) and Weber (1997).
4state declines, then the state’s sanctioned ability to protect one’s property rights is also
diminished. Similarly, if one group’s relation with the state is strengthened then they
will be better off because the state will extend privileges and rights in exchange for
the increased support. The losing group will resist these changes. The reason that they
are not successful is the impending need of society to increase the effectiveness of
their military, which often entails increasing the amount of resources allocated to
warfare and possibly more efficient techniques of applying military force, e.g. new
military tactics or weapons. It is because of the constitution of society that a new state
emerges in this time of crisis. Various groups who were previously not willing to
protest now find a situation where their effort to provide support to the state in
exchange for privileges and rights can be accommodated so as to increase the military
strength of the state, which is needed if the society wishes to live on. During this crisis
then various groups compete to form relationships with the state and among
themselves that be to their advantage while increasing the military strength of the
state. Once the crisis is over, i.e. the outside military threat is more or less stable, the
new political institutions become stable and there is little chance of major change,
unless the ruling group and their supporters do not have a decisive military advantage
over those under the rule of the state but offer little to the state. This is why in the
ancient period serving in the military was a privilege. One has to condition one’s
thinking away from the modern period where military service is an obligation to be
avoided if possible. Today, states collect taxes from every citizen directly via
telephones, computers and cars. In the ancient period, without modern transportation
and communication, people and orders could only travel as fast as a horse or boat and
the state was forced to engage wealthy families to get access to use of the people and
resources under their local control. Back in the ancient period the game was different
and such that the local aristocrats and wealthy people tried to gain control of as much
land and over as many people they could. In doing so, they effectively put themselves
between the state and the use of these resources. When the state wanted the use of
these resources they would require the consent of the local powerful people, who
would exact a price for their use–privileges and rights.
In the analysis of property rights in this paper the concept of property rights is
taken as a very general concept. It is not a patent or any written formal constitutional
right as agreed to by all. It is rather the ability to perform–or get away with–certain
actions. Even if merchants are despised as long as they are tolerated they enjoy certain
property rights. In thinking about this general formulation of property rights avoiding
the modern very clear formal distinctions of various rights is to be avoided. It’s
essentially about what you can get away with doing within a society. There may be
5social resistance to your actions but as long as you can carry out those actions
reasonably well, it is said here that you have property rights with respect to these
actions. It may also be true that social resistance is overwhelming in which case it is
said here that you do not have property rights with respect to these actions.
3) Ancient China
The Western Zhou feudal system was established around 1100 BC in China. A king
was set up at the capital and various lords were enoeffed with regional fiefs in the
surrounding areas. There were fair distances between the capital and the regions. The
official titles and lands were hereditary in nature. The regional lords provided some
taxes to the king and also provided military services, which were based on the army of
the fief and under the authority of regional lord. The latter acknowledged the authority
of the king and received royal benefits and privileges in return. Largely due to
nomadic barbarian intrusions from the west and north the capital city was weakened
and political dominance of the king had waned by the 8th century BC.
In the early Western Zhou the heart of the state was its fortified capital and
some surrounding satellite garrisons. The king was the leader of a group of nobles,
who had claim to the highest offices of state. Some of these other noble groups were
relatives of the king, while others were unrelated powerful local noble families. The
residents of the capital included the army troops and their descendants who were led
by the ruler and the elite. Members of this group were the rough counterparts to
citizens of the city-state in ancient Greece. Civil and military obligations were
assigned to this group and they were given the privilege of consulting on state affairs
and emergencies on occasion. People outside of the capital city, in the surrounding
countryside, lived in nearby villages enjoyed a degree of autonomy while providing
taxes and various services. This basic political structure was emulated by the fiefs and
their lords on a smaller scale.5
During the early years of the Western Zhou, royal customs and religion defined
bonds among the elite. Around the 9th century BC, the royal Zhou court began to loose
power and authority devolved to the regional powers. In the following centuries as
population grew conflicts increased among the regional lords. Conflict between these
increasingly independent states led to the formation of coalitions. In the earliest stage
the coalitions formed under the dominance of a hegemon, often in response to
5 See Hsu (1999), pp. 570, 572; Lin (1981), pp. 38–51.
6aggression by a powerful state. For example, in the 7th century BC Lord Huan of Qi
was the first major hegemon who protected the northern countries from the southern
aggressor, Chu. After Lord Huan led an allied force that defeated Chu, the latter
retreated and formed a southern alliance. For the next century and a half the military
and political history of China was dominated by the conflict of these two coalitions,
the northern alliance usually controlled by Jin and the southern alliance under Chu
leadership.6
As conflicts increased among an increasing number of regional powers
secondary feudalization began around the early 7th century BC. Secondary
feudalization is a process were the regional lords of the original Western Zhou feudal
system usurp power and begin to establish their own fiefs by bestowing lands to
newly created branches of noble families and meritorious generals. The peak of
secondary feudalization was the last quarter of the 7th century, but thereafter few new
notable families were established. Around the end of the 7th century, there was likely a
scarcity of available land to distribute and this likely brought an end to secondary
feudalization.7
In the 7th and 6th centuries BC, as power devolved from center to region,
internal conflicts increased as well. The powerful ministerial families, who were in
charge of the army, began to usurp power from the leader and civil wars became
common.8
During this period of internal insurrection and civil war, covenants were
increasingly used to create and reinforce relations between competing groups within a
state. As Lewis explains it:9
“Covenants were often sealed between families conspiring to arrange the selection of
a particular prince as heir apparent, to seize the throne, or to destroy an enemy who
seemed on the verge of seizing it himself. In some cases, such“private”covenants
were likewise sealed between the current ruler of a state and parties whose support
was essential to maintain his rule.”
Here we see the beginning of the key exchange that takes place in the process
of state formation. Covenants created bonds between two groups: a leader group and a
6 See Hsu (1965), pp. 53–54; Lewis (1990), pp. 43–47.
7 See Hsu (1999), pp. 570–571.
8 See Hsu (1965), pp. 56–58.
9 See Lewis (1990), p. 48.
7supporting group. The exchange involves the supporting group making commitments
to the leader group. These commitments included the mobilization of both human and
other resources in time of need. In return, the leader group extends to the supporting
group benefits and protection, including protection of their liberties over their lives
and properties as well as enhancement of their social status. At its most fundamental
level we see the during the state formation process the exchange of support for
property rights between groups, which creates new political institutions.
One noteworthy example is the capital populace (guo ren). During this period
of increasing internal turbulence, as rulers and ministers competed for control they
increasingly made moves to gain the support of the capital city inhabitants, who could
be mobilized for military service or mob action. These residents were composed of
the lowest level of nobility (shi) as well as merchants and artisans. The former were
the primary constituent of the army. The inhabitants of the capital cities came to play
a decisive role in the struggles between the rulers and ministers and often decided the
succession to the throne. Therefore, ambitious men sought to win their favor and
would seal a covenant with the capital populace. In this way, new social groups were
drawn into the political order and bound to the emerging rulers.10
As the ruling groups in the rural towns solidified their positions by extending
rights to groups previously excluded within the town, they also increased in
competition with one another. This led the rulers to appeal to other previously
disenfranchised groups in the town’s hinterlands. Nearby rural villages were brought
into relation with the ruling group through another exchange of support for rights.
One of the earliest reforms of this type took place in the country of Qi. The
ruler of Qi, Huan Gong, and his main minister carried out a major political reform in
685 BC. The capital city was divided into 21 districts including 6 districts for
merchants and artisans. Many other districts outside of the capital city in the
surrounding countryside were also established. These districts were administrative
units that organized collection of taxes and military service and served as an
organizational unit for the army. District troops were grouped together in a hierarchy
to form the army of Qi. This new army had a large number of standing troops. The
provision of taxes and military service to the new political institution was one part of
the exchange. The new groups brought into this system enjoyed the benefits of state
registration and the protection that implicitly came with it. They also enjoyed
10 See Chao (1996), pp. 373–75; Chao (1992), pp. 20–22; Lewis (1990), pp. 48–49; Yang (1999),
pp. 806–07.
8increases protection of their property by the state and their social status. Another
example, in 633 B.C. the country of Jin reorganized its military into three armies
based on administrative regions and further increased its military in 588 B.C. to six
armies. Jin accomplished this by extending military service to members of the
countryside that had not previously been in the army.11
In 594 B.C. at a time when the country of Lu faced increasing external threats
and internal power struggles, a new political institution emerged where taxes were
levied according to the acreage of arable land. Previously, noble families contributed
to state finances, but now new previously non-elite groups provided fiscal support to
the state. In 590 B.C. military duties were extended to inhabitants of the countryside.
At least a good share of the old elite had likely resisted these reforms as can be seen
by the internal power struggles of this era.12
The height of the state formation process that dramatically increased the
number of people previously excluded from political affairs in the exchange of
support for property rights was the appearance and development of the county (xian).
The county was a large formal administrative unit in which land was allocated to
families in exchange for taxes and military service. While many countries of the
Warring States period (453–221 B.C.) established counties, the country of Qin, a
late-comer, was the most successful in instituting these political reforms. These
reforms established the administrative support for a large army that eventually unified
all of China for the first time in 221 B.C.
One eminent scholar views the expansion of the exchange of rights for support
as a fundamental feature of the process of state formation of this period. According to
Mark Lewis:
“In the competition to mobilize ever larger bodies of men, various states began to
claim the services of the populations of their rural hinterlands and the lower social
classes, which had hitherto played no political role. These reforms involve the
allocation of land–gained through the opening of new territories to cultivation or
through conquest–in exchange for the payment of taxes and the provision of labor
and military service. The process was progressively extended in various states, until it
culminated in the reforms of Shang Yang in the Qin state, where the entire adult, male
population was registered, ranked, and allocated land on the basis of military service.
11 See Hsu (1999), p. 573.
12 Hsu (1999), p. 573.
9Carrying out these reforms entailed the development of new administrative organs for
effective local government throughout the territory of the state, practices for
registering and policing large populations, and methods to measure and allocate land.
These policies, originally designed for mass mobilization and the control of infantry
armies, became the basis for control of the civil population.”13
One of the most important events of the Warring States period (453–221 B.C.)
was the miraculous rise of the relatively backward country of Qin, which has its
beginnings as a fief of a royal horse breeder. In 361 B.C. a new ruler, Duke Xiao,
ascended the throne in Qin. He announced that the government of Qin was seeking
talented men to serve in his government. A young man named Shang Yang from the
bordering state of Wei arrived seeking employment. Shang Yang advised Duke Xiao
to implement a series of reforms, which were immediately opposed by many
Confucian scholars in the Qin court. In many cases of this era, Confucian scholars
essentially served as the conservative mouthpiece for the established nobility resisting
change and honoring tradition. Eventually, Shang Yang was hired and convinced
Duke Xiao to implement his reforms, which aimed to centralize taxation. Shang Yang
ordered that all households be registered by administrators. This edict had been
previously issued. The fact that he had to reissue this edict indicates that the powerful
noble families had blocked the implementation of the previous edict. The first round
of Shang Yang’s reforms was implemented with only limited success. In 350 B.C. the
Qin capital was moved to Xianyang. This was a major strategic move for Duke Xiao
and his reform minded advisor Shang Yang. The new capital area had fewer powerful
families than the former capital. The region was more fertile and close to a strategic
pass. In that year 41 new counties were established in the Qin domain. Each county
had a salaried county magistrate who was appointed by the court. Border counties
opened up new land and encouraged immigration of peasants from neighboring
countries. Land was registered with the county magistrate and allocated to families in
exchange for taxes, military service and other duties. This allocation of land included
the state’s recognition of the registered owner’s right to use the property. Two types of
counties developed–one with under 10,000 households and the other with more than
10,000 households. The new state that formed operated in a way that better
implemented directives of the central authority. Households forwarded taxes to the
county magistrates, who in turn followed orders and turned the taxes over to the court.
The result was a massive increase in state funds and a large professional army
emerged, which gave Duke Xiao the means to enforce his political reforms
throughout the entire country. Qin’s army proved to be dominant and all the other
13 See Lewis (1990), p. 9.
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major countries were eventually defeated by Qin. The defeated countries were divided
into counties with centrally appointed county magistrates. Eventually the counties
were grouped into prefectures, so that a two-tier regional government developed
where prefects served as the administrative intermediary between the capital and its
constituent counties. In 221 B.C. Qin conquered the last country and unified China for
the first time.14
We see then in the transition from a feudal system to a unified empire during
the 1100–221 B.C. period, when faced with an increasing military threat ruling
groups or potential ruling groups sought out enough support from various groups in
society to meet this increased threat. In exchange for support groups were given
various privileges and rights. Foremost in ancient China’s case was the right to own
and use land, which was sanctioned by the state. This new support base for the state
enjoyed more property rights as a result.
4) Ancient Greece
Tyrannies appear throughout much of ancient Greek history. Tyrannies are
known to have existed from the early 7th century, when aristocratic governments
began to weaken, to the 2nd century, when Rome began to extend its rule over Greece.
The traditional age of Greek tyrants, where the tyrants were widespread and
commonly appeared in Greek cities, is about 650 B.C.–500 B.C. It should be noted
that tyrants did not only appear on the Greek mainland but also in colonies abroad
such as Syracuse in Sicily.
A tyrant was a man who obtained the sole power of state and ruled in defiance
of previous political institutions. Tyrants usurped power by force rather than rising
legitimately within the existing traditions. Some tyrants were military men and many
were aristocrats. One common characteristic of tyrannies is that they were reigns that
clearly opposed the aristocratic rule and the exclusive privileges of the nobility.
Indeed, tyranny was an important part of the transition from the aristocratic states of
the early 7th century to the classical Greek democratic city-states of the 5th century.
The modern term “dictator” has only limited applicability here at best. The rule of a
tyrant was not necessarily unpopular. The rule of an exclusive minority was being
violated and rights and privileges were extended to other groups that were previously
excluded from the political and social elite. In fact some tyrannies were very popular.
14 See Edwards (2003), pp. 114–136; Lin (1981), pp. 71–80, 181–83, 188–90; Wei (2003); Yang
(2002), pp. 1–6.
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Furthermore, tyrants often came to power during periods of political crisis. External
military threats or internal chaos often provided the conditions that allowed tyrants to
find sympathetic support for their rule and to seize the reigns of power. Thus, in
ancient Greek history the title “tyrant” did not necessarily imply that the ruler was 
brutal or unwelcome.15
To understand the role the tyrants played in ancient Greek political
development it must be kept in mind that the 650–500 B.C. period was a period of
political transition. To appreciate this one needs to have a rough understanding of the
political states before and after the transition. On the Greek mainland after the violent
upheavals that swept the Mediterranean at the end of the 2nd millennium local
kingships slowly developed in the 10th and 9th centuries. It was during the 8th century
that aristocrats wrestled away leadership from the kings and established numerous
aristocratic states throughout the Greek world. These emerging cities were only small
agricultural towns or settlements that would later develop into classical Greek
city-states.16 Hundreds of such cities emerged in the 8th century as power passed from
kings to nobles.17
The Greek aristocracies were based on a tribal organization, which also
persisted in various forms for centuries after the breakdown of aristocratic rule. The
largest division was the tribe (phyle), whose names correspond to racial classifications.
For instance all Dorian states included the three tribes Hylleis, Pamphyloi, and
Dymanes. Athens and many other Ionian states included the four tribes Geeleontes,
Hoplethes, Aigikoreis and Argadeis. These tribes were likely divisions of original
races that were in existence when major migrations or invasions penetrated the Greek
peninsula. In each state the tribe was subdivided into phratries or “brotherhoods,” 
which contained smaller units called genos–clans or groups of families. This
organization was largely kinship based, where a phratry or a tribe had a common
ancestor. Yet fictitious kinship ties were probably not uncommon. The phratries thus
shared a common cult, which provided some bonds among members.
This tribal organization was the political institution that provided the basis for
the army as well as political, legal and fiscal administration. This system gave
important political, legal and social privileges to the nobles, who led the cults of their
kinship groups. The central authority of this tribal organization was an exclusive
council of aristocrats, who often elected their magistrates. Hereditary rule by powerful
aristocratic families was common within this political institution.
Various versions of the tribal organization were common in Greece around the
15 Andrewes (1963), pp. 7–9; Demand (1996), pp. 110–11; Martin (1996), pp. 79–81; and Murray
(1993), pp. 137–39.
16 Few walled cities existed before the 5th century. Fine (1983), p. 56.
17 Fine (1983), pp. 53–61.
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early 7th century. Over the course of the following centuries classical democratic
Greek city-states developed. A developed city-state had an assembly of all full
citizens, which included all free adult males. This contrasted to the previous councils
based on noble birth. In principle this assembly handled all government affairs. All
the qualified citizens that were willing and able to attend handled the proposals. There
was no representative nature to the administration. However, the assembly could not
initiate business. A smaller council was created and discussed public business
beforehand. The proposals from the council were then put to the assembly for vote.
The preliminary management of proposals was called probouleusis and functioned to
reduce the unruliness of direct management by an assembly, which was too large to
effectively handle detailed affairs. The council was composed of ordinary citizens
chosen by lot for a term of one year.
The tyrannies of the period 650–500 B.C. thus can be seen as a form of
government that was set against the aristocratic rule and privileges of the nobility,
which was widespread in the early 7th century. During the reign of tyrants various
rights and privileges were extended to groups that were previously excluded by the
nobles. As the tyrants were eventually pushed out, the new political institutions that
emerged retained many aspects of the changes introduced by the tyrants. In particular,
political rights were extended to a much larger cut of society than had been previously
known under the rule of aristocrats in the early 7th century.18
The age of Greek tyrannies coincided with other developments that played
crucial roles in these political developments. Arguably most important was commerce
and trade, which had experienced increasing growth from the late 8th century through
the 6th century. Coinage appeared in Greece around the last quarter of the 7th century.
The fact that tyrannies tended to appear in places where there were trading cities, such
as in the seafaring states around the Isthmus of Corinth, suggests that a new group of
rich families played an important role in these political developments. New families
that made their wealth from agriculture, trade and commerce had the means to begin
to challenge the privileged rule of the aristocrats. The increased size of this group
likely played no small part in the political developments of this period, as the tyrants
could expect many of this group to be sympathetic to their claims and to provide
support for them. However, general unrest among these groups was not enough. A
specific crisis was often the immediate catalyst to political change.19
This expansion in trade increased contacts with the Near East. The century
from 750 to 650 B.C., the so-called Orientalizing period, was an era of increased
contact with the Phoenicians. Greek culture interacted and evolved in response to
18 See Andrewes (1963), pp. 8- 16.
19 See Botsford and Robinson (1969), pp. 71–2; Demand (1996), p. 110; Fine (1983), 98–9; Martin
(1996), p. 58; and Sealey (1976), pp. 39, 43, 55–9.
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Phoenician ideas, especially in the areas of art, religion and literacy. The Greeks
adapted the Phoenician alphabet with the use of vowels to develop the earliest form of
modern Greek script. During the century from 750 to 650 B.C. writing spread to a
considerable share Greek society and by the 5th century B.C. the average Athenian
male could read and write.20
An important development during the 7th and 6th centuries in Greece was the
codification of previously unwritten laws. The aristocrats had used their influence to
interpret and apply unwritten rules in their interests. The reappearance of a written
language in Greece contributed to the writing of the laws. It should be recalled that
the syllabic Linear B script was lost after the collapse of the Mycenaean civilization.
The Greek written language was invented around the mid-8th century along the Syrian
coast and adopted aspects of the north Semitic alphabet. By about the mid-7th century
this written language appeared in Greece. During the 7th and 6th centuries many cities
had pressured the aristocrats to allow the laws to be written and to be made public.
This contributed to the weakening of the aristocrats’ legal and socialdominance over
local society.21
Lastly, it should be mentioned that the development of the hoplite army likely
did not play a key causal role in the emergence of the Greek tyrannies of the 650–
500 B.C. period. This view is commonly held and based on the fact that the hoplite
equipment first appeared in Greece around the last quarter of the 8th century and
organized hoplite phalanx has been established to exist from about 650 B.C. These
observations seem to suggest that potential tyrants had many opportunities to appear
in the first half of the 7th century, which does not agree with their known history.22
Argos
The first known tyrant in Greece was Pheidon of Argos. He came to power
sometime around 670 and about this time defeated the Spartans at Hysiae giving
Argos control of the plain of Thyrea, which bordered the territories of Argos and
Sparta. Pheidon then extended hegemony throughout the northeastern part of the
Peloponnese, introduced standard measures to the region, and in a show of power
imposed his presidency on the competition at Olympia in 668. Pheidon may have
introduced some military innovations, which were helpful in bringing him to power at
Argos.23
20 Murray (1993), pp. 81–101.
21 Fine (1983), pp. 100–04.
22 See Sealey (1976), pp. 56–9; and van Wees (2000).
23 Andrewes (1963), pp. 39–42; and Sealey (1976), pp. 40–45.
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Sicyon
Another tyranny arose in Sicyon around the early 6th century. To appreciate
certain aspects of this and other tyrannies in the Peloponnese one needs to understand
the racial situation of the era. A race of Greek peoples called the Dorians gradually
moved into central Greece. Probably from the 10th to the 8th centuries, small groups of
Dorians migrated south into the Peloponnese. Descendants of the Mycenaeans, or
their ruling class, were among the original non-Dorian peoples. Those non-Dorians
that resisted the Dorian move into the Peloponnese were pushed to the west coast or
into the Arcadian mountains. Many non-Dorians in the Peloponnese were conquered
by various states and reduced to various types of surfs, most notoriously in Sparta.
The tribes in many Peloponnesian states came to include three Dorian tribes:
Dymanes, Hylleis and the Pamphyloi. The Dorians were in a position in which they
needed to provide legitimacy for their rule over the non-Dorians. In an effective act of
political propaganda the Dorians invented a legend of an ancestor, Heracles, who had
held lands in the Peloponnese and that they were merely returning to reclaim the lands
of their ancestors. By the end of the Dark Ages this legend had become widespread in
Peloponnese. The tensions between Dorian and non-Dorian peoples in the
Peloponnese had an important influence since within many states developed social
gradations along racial lines. One effect of the tyrants in the Peoloponnese was to
lessen or remove these social privileges that had arose from racial distinctions. By the
5th century, most Dorian states included, in addition to the three traditional Dorian
tribes, a fourth tribe under various names that was composed of non-Dorian citizens.24
Around the mid-7th century Orthagas established his rule at Sicyon. At this time
racial tensions seem to be absent in Sicyon. Over the next half a century a regional
tension developed that involved Sicyon. Delphi was a town that had existed since the
Mycenaean period. Although it had been destroyed in the Mycenaean collapse, it
revived in the Dark Age and served as a local sanctuary. A nearby port city, Cirrha,
along the northern coase of the Gulf of Corinth controlled the route from the sea to
Delphi and was in a position to collect tolls from numerous traveling pilgrims. The
city likely heavily influenced if not controled Delphi’s popular sanctuary. Cirha’s 
growing influence over maritime trade and over the Delphi’s sanctuary put Cirha in 
conflict with a number of Greek states, including Athens, Sicyon and Thessaly.25
Athens came in conflict with Delphi around 632 B.C. when Delphi had
encouraged the attempt by Cylon to become a tyrant at Athens. Delphi had developed
into a competing port city in the Gulf of Corinth for Sicyon and also had opposed
24 Andrewes (1963), pp. 54–5; Fine (1983), pp. 121–22; Martin (1996), pp. 34, 38; Oliva (1981), p.
63; and Sealey (1976), p. 12.
25 Andrewes (1963), p. 57; and Fine (1983), pp. 114–16, 122)
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policies of Cleisthenes at Sicyon. Thessaly had made several attempts to expand its
influence into southern Greece, but Cirrha had offered resistance. This situation gave
rise to the First Sacred War in ca. 595 B.C. A number of states, including Athens,
Sicyon and Thessaly, waged war against Cirrha and Delphi for influence over
maritime trade and control of the sanctuary at Delphi. The Thessalian forces played a
major role and Alcmeon led a contingent of forces from Athens. The war became
protracted and the later stages involved a siege of Cirrha. Cleisthenes from Sicyon
raised a fleet and cut the flow of supplies to Cirrha. The city fell around 590 B.C. and
Cirrha was razed. The First Sacred War was a turning point for Delphi. By around this
time Apollo was made the god of Delphi, which over the next several centuries
became a great Panhellenic center of Greek religion. A major festival was organized at
Delphi to celebrate the victory of the First Sacred War, where these games achieved
fame second only to the Olympic games.26
In Sicyon a tyrant, Cleisthenes, came to power and ruled about 600–570 B.C.
Cleisthenes had played a major role in the First Sacred War and was a leading figure
in Greece in the first quarter of the 6th century. He established a festival at Sicyon with
the spoils from the war. Cleisthenes, who was likely a grandson of Orthagoras, had
also led Sicyon in war against Argos. Around the time of his ascension Cleisthenes
stirred up resentment against Argos and the Dorians. Cleisthenes pursued anti-Argive
policies at Sicyon. He changed the practices of the cult of Adrastus, a hero of Argos,
by replacing the worship of Adrastus with Melanippos, the legendary enemy of
Adrastus. He restricted the use of some Homeric poems, which celebrated the
achievements of Argos. Most importantly, Cleisthenes made a major reform in the
tribal system.27
Before the rise of Cleisthenes, there were three traditional Dorian tribes at
Sicyon, which also existed in Argos. The three traditional Dorian tribes were
Dymanes, Hylleis and Pamphyli. During his ascension Cleisthenes clearly appealed to
non-Dorian elements of the population for support. The anti-Dorian sentiment was
exploited and Cleisthenes carried out a major reform of the tribal system. The names
of the traditional Dorian tribes were changed to Choirentas, Hyatai and Oneatai,
which were less than flattering names popular among non-Dorians. A fourth tribe,
which Cleisthenes belonged, was named Archelaoi (or rulers). This reform was a
major internal reorganization must have caused a local upheaval. This reform was the
basis of Cleisthenes’ power. This tribal reorganization persisted for some time after 
Cleisthenes’ death.28
26 Andrewes (1963), pp. 47, 59–60; Fine (1983), pp. 115–18; and Sealey (1976), p. 47.
27 Andrewes (1963), pp. 58–60, 65; Fine (1983), pp. 115, 122; Osborne (1996), p. 282; and Sealey
(1976), p. 45.
28 Andrewes (1963), p. 59; Fine (1983), pp. 121–22; Osborne (1996), p. 282; and Sealey (1976), pp.
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In the Olympic games of 576 B.C. Cleisthenes won the chariot race. At this
event he invited potential suitors for his daughter, Agariste. Many cities sent a suitor
to Sicyon and two arrived from Athens. Cleisthenes chose Megacles, the son of
Alcmaeon who had commanded the Athenian forces in the First Sacred War. The
marriage of Megacles and Agariste let to two notable descendants. Their son,
Cleisthenes, named after his grandfather, established the tribes and democracy for the
Athenians. The great Athenian statesman Pericles was a grandson of Agariste.29
The tyranny at Sicyon lasted for some time after the death of Cleisthenes. About
550 B.C. the Spartans rid Sicyon of its tyranny and put the Dorians back in power.
The Dorian tribe names were changed back to Hylleis, Pamphyli and Dymanatae and
the fourth tribe was named Aegialeis, which was the name of the legendary son of
Adrastus.30
While there were many factors that contributed to the rise of tyranny at Sicyon,
internal problems was probably most important. If external threats were the main
cause Cleisthenes would have required the support of the Dorian tribes and would
likely not have marginalized them as he did. He clearly played to anti-Dorian
sympathies in his rise.31 [The folowing is me:] Cleisthenes’ tribal reorganization 
likely involved a change in the right of appointment of tribal leaders–otherwise such
derogatory names would not have been accepted. With the gain of the power of
appointment also came a realignment of the base of support.
Corinth (Cypselus ca. 658–ca. 628, Periander ca. 628–ca. 588,
Psammetichus ca. 588–ca. 585)
Corinth was a city located near the isthmus separating the Gulf of Corinth from
the Saronic Gulf, which connected the Greek mainland with the Peloponnese. The
natural advantages in maritime trade that Corinth possessed were not seriously
exploited until the rise of the Bacchiad rule. In the early 8th century, Corinth was ruled
by a monarchy, whose royal family included the Bacchiad clan. Around the middle of
the 8th century, the Bacchiad clan overthrew the monarchy and established its rule.
The main change in political institutions was that the chief power no longer was held
by a hereditary king but rather in a larger clan, which annually selected a chief
magistrate. Other features of the political institutions largely remained unchanged.
There were also assisting officers and a council. The power of the Bacchiads came
45–7.
29 Andrewes (1963), p. 61; Fine (1983), pp. 118–19; and Sealey (1976), p. 46.
30 Andrewes (1963), p.61; Fine (1983), pp. 123–24; and Sealey (1976), p. 45.
31 Andrewes (1963), p. 59.
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from the wealth derived from their lands and from their noble family tradition.32
Under the Bacchiads in the later half of the 8th century, Corinth experienced an
expansion in western trade and contacts with the Near East. Bacchiad nobles were
sent out with groups of settlers to establish two Corinthian colonies. One colony was
established at Syracuse in 733 B.C. on the island of Sicily. Another colony was set up
at about the same time at Corcyra in the Ionian Sea to serve as a stop for ships
heading west. These colonies played an important role in the westward extension of
Corinthian trade, which was predominant in the west during the late 8th century.
Contacts with the Near East stimulated the development of Protocorinthian pottery in
the last quarter of the 8th century. A new style of warship was developed at Corinth
and some were sold to a foreign power engaged in a war. The development of trade
likely increased the duties collected by Bacchiads in Corinth.33
In the first half of the 7th century Bacchiad rule experienced a series of setbacks.
Megara had recovered some land that had been appropriated previously by Corinth.
Under the tyrant Pheidon, the expansion of Argos’ power may have come at the 
expense of the Corinthians around this time. In the 660s Corinth fought a naval battle
with Corcyra, which resulted in a loss of some control over the colony. These setbacks
in foreign relations most likely had a detrimental effect on Corinthian trade. In
addition, these incidents contributed to the growing resentment of Bacchiad rule in
Corinth.34
The development of trade increased the wealth and prosperity of the
Corinthians, many of which were outside the Bacchiad clan. This group of local
powerful families resented the exclusive rule and privileges enjoyed by the Bacchiad
clan. As a number of excluded families gained wealth and a following of local
residents they also gained the means to resist and challenge Bacchiad rule, which was
increasingly viewed as an oppressive oligarchy.35
The Bacchiads were an exclusive clan to the extent that they prohibited
marriage outside of their clan. An exception was made for one Bacchiad woman,
Labda, was lame. She married a man Aetion, who was not from the Bacchiad
bloodline. Their son, Cypselus, grew up on the fringe of the political elite. Later he
likely gained the support of powerful families, which were excluded by the Bacchiad
clan, in the villages surrounding Corinth. Cypselus politically made use of his partial
noble bloodline and appealed to the resentment of powerful families outside the
Bacchiad clan and gained power. In ca. 658 B.C. Cypselus killed the last reigning
Bacchiad ruler and established a tyranny at Corinth, which entailed many major
32 Andrewes (1963), pp. 43, 48; and Fine (1983), p. 109.
33 Andrewes (1963), pp. 43–4; Fine (1983), p. 109; and Sealey (1976), p. 50.
34 Andrewes (1963), pp. 43–4; and Fine (1983), p. 109.
35 Andrewes (1963), p. 44, 49; and Sealey (1976), p. 58.
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changes. Cypselus killed or exiled many supporters of the Bacchiad regime. Among
the exiles, according to tradition, settled in Etruscan Tarquinii whose son later ruled
Rome as Tarquinius Priscus. The property of these supporters were confiscated and
redistributed to the supporters of Cypselus. His rule was mild toward those other than
the Bacchiad clan and their supporters. In addition to the support of the powerful
families that had been previously excluded by the Bacchiad clan, he gained many
supporters who had debt. He recalled those who the Bacchiad rulers had exiled. Not
only did the property right system dramatically change during the rise of Cypselus but
the system of political rights also experienced radical change. The exclusive
monopoly on political power by the Bacchiad clan was broken. Members of Cypselus’ 
council and minor officials were drawn from a new class that had previously been
restricted from government affairs. Hoplite infantry may have also gained a degree of
political power under the tyranny of Corinth, as Cypselus had the support of his army.
However, the role of any organized hoplite troops in the rise of tyranny at Corinth
appears not to have been substantial. In short, the tyranny of Cypselus at Corinth was
fairly popular.36
After ruling Corinth from ca. 658 to ca. 628 B.C. Cypselus died and his son
Periander became tyrant of Corinth. At the onset of his reign ca. 638–ca. 588 B.C.,
Periander likely lacked the support that his father had enjoyed and in order to secure
his position turned against powerful people who opposed his tyranny. His rule was
less popular than that of his father and no doubt at times brutal. Nonetheless,
Periander was an able and energetic ruler, who was more militarily active than his
predecessor. A few years after the death of Periander the tyranny at Corinth came to
an end. The tyranny was replaced by an oligarchy, which was much more broadly
based than that of the Bacchiads.37
Under the Corinthian tyranny many policies were pursued more vigorously than
under Bacchiad rule. Numerous colonies were established and Corinth was active in
foreign policy, particularly under Periander. The tyrants encouraged commercial trade
and supported a program of public construction.
Both Cypselus and Periander founded colonies on the northern shore of the
Corinthian Gulf, along the northwestern coast of Greece as well as in other places.
These colonies served several purposes. In some cases they allowed the tyrants to
send their political enemies abroad. They served as ports for traveling ships to the
west and also to support a modest fleet to protect the seas from pirates. In addition,
they increased opportunities for trade with the mainland. For instance, Periander
established Poteidaea in part to open up trade with Macedon. Under the tyrants,
36 Andrewes (1963), pp. 43–9; Fine (1983), pp. 109–11; and Sealey (1976), pp. 48–9, 53–58.
37 Andrewes (1963), pp. 50, 52; and Fine (1983), pp. 111–12, 114.
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Corinthian wares were exported more than those of other Greek city-states of the
time.38
In foreign policy the tyrants were active, particularly during the reign of
Periander. Delphi had supported the rise of Cypselus against the Bacchiade (??).
Cypselus made dedications at the Delphi sanctuary and built a treasury for the
oferings. Delphi and Corinth enjoyed good relations during Cypselus’ tyranny. The 
rise of tyranny in the Isthmus states around this time weakened the influence of Argos,
which it had previously enjoyed. Alignments among the great Greek city-states
changed in accordance with their interests. Under Periander Corinth and Athens
became closer allies in part because a common enemy emerged. Periander maintained
relations with powerful rulers outside of the Greek world as well. The Corinthian
tyrants also commonly participated in Panhellenic festivals.39
The tyrants relative to their predecessors vigorously supported commercial
trade. One major public construction project that Periander undertook was a runway
across the isthmus. Ships on rollers could cross the isthmus moving from gulf to gulf
and avoid the long voyage around the Peloponnesus. Both Cypselus and Periander
likely pursued a large construction program at Corinth. Streets, drains and fountains
were built in the city. The construction projects also served as a method of providing
employment for many local inhabitants. Periander prohibited the acquisition of slaves
in part to increase employment opportunities for the free population. The Corinthian
tyrants maintained an ostentatious court and were patrons to various artists and poets.
The active pursuit of foreign expansion through diplomacy, the establishment of
colonies and increased trade as well as political change and city improvements all
combined to bring greater prosperity and influence for Corinth than previously
known.40
After the death of Periander, a nephew Psammetichus became ruler but was
killed within a few years thus bringing the era Corinthian tyranny (ca. 658–ca. 585
B.C.) to an end. The Bacchiad clan had raised Corinth to prominent city for the first
time in Greek history and the tyrants built themselves and the city to a great position
in the Greek world. Periander’s active foreign and domestic policies likely 
overstrained his support in Corinth and this set the stage for the early fall of his
successor.41
The rise of the Corinthian tyrants and the events leading to it offer an important
episode for political economic historians to consider in studying political and
economic rights. The state formation process at work in Corinth is clearly related to
38 Andrewes (1963), p. 50; Fine (1983), p. 112; and Sealey (1976), pp. 51, 52, 55.
39 Andrewes (1963), pp. 47–51; and Sealey (1976), p. 57.
40 Andrewes (1963), pp. 50; Fine (1983), pp. 112–14; and Sealey (1976), pp. 51–2, 54–8.
41 Andrewes (1963), p. 52.
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the changes in the distribution among the populace of both political and economic
rights. The rise of Bacchiads in the mid-8th century very modestly expanded the
political power under the monarchy by replacing a hereditary king with an exclusive
oligarchy. The Bacchiad clan monopolized the most important offices and annually
selected the chief magistrate. For a half a century, the Bacchiads dominated political
life yet allowed the expansion of some trade. For nearly a century under Bacchiad rule,
trade and limited agricultural improvements increased prosperity among the
Bacchiads and other local notable families. Over this period the power of the state
likely became somewhat more diffuse in the system of coercive force at Corinth. The
military force at Corinth was likely little more than a collection of small private forces,
each controlled by a powerful family in the city proper or in the nearby dependent
villages. By the second quarter of the 7th century, many rich and powerful families
had come to resent the exclusive nature of Bacchiad rulers. They were ready to
improve their social standing by seizing political rights and exercising more economic
liberties, all of which were restricted by the Bacchiad clan. Cypselus’ social position 
on the fringe of the ruling elite provided him with a political opportunity, one that he
exploited in his own interests. Cypselus appealed to the resentment of Bacchiad rule
by the excluded rich and powerful families at Corinth. Their support and Cypselus’ 
background allowed the tyrant to wrestle away legitimate rule from the Bacchiad clan
and remove them from power. The Bacchiads lost all political power and their
economic rights were infringed upon through confiscation of their property, exile and
in some cases loss of their life. New powerful groups and others were given new
political rights such as serving on the council or as an assisting officer. These new
groups now found their interests tied to the new regime and also in the repression of
the supporters of the previous rulers. This was a major change in the system of
political and economic rights at Corinth. The tyrants had increased the power of the
state by obtaining the support of a more numerous group with wealth. Both force of
arms and political support were required to prop up the tyrants and maintain their rule
of Corinth.
The main factor that seems to have been at work in the rise of tyranny at
Corinth was the spread of wealth and power to a wider share of society beyond the
Bacchiad clan. Although the Bacchiads were Dorian, anti-Dorian sentiment does not
seem to be an important factor. Rather the exclusive nature of Bacchiad rule appears
to be the main social tension. National sentiment against Pheidon of Argos may have
contributed some to the rise of Corinthian tyranny as well. The development of
hoplite troops and tactics may have taken place around this time, but its role in the
rise of tyranny does not appear dominant. Rather, I see the development of hoplite
warfare around the 7th and 6th centuries as playing a more important role in retaining
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the political and economic rights gained under the tyrants after the collapse of tyranny
at Corinth. The relatively greater share of rich and powerful families that had been
extended political and economic rights under the tyrants along with the hoplites had
gained sufficient cohesiveness to obtain similar rights under the oligarchy that
replaced the tyrants. The new oligarchy was based on much wider support and was far
less exclusive than the Bacchiad clan had been. This broader support can also be
detected in the fact that Corinth maintained control over many of its colonies after the
collapse of tyranny.42
Megara
Around the 630s a tyranny began in Megara under Theagenes, who led a revolt
against some rich local families. Theagenes had a son-in-law named Cylon, who he
attempted to set up as a tyrant at Athens. In 632 B.C. when Cylon tried to seize the
acropolis, Theagenes sent him troops.43
In sum, we can see that during the period 1000–500 B.C. many states went
through a period of state formation. Largely because of the period of prosperous trade
that occurred in trading cities, new wealth was gained by families outside of the ruling
elite. This group of wealthy non-aristocrats formed a group that was willing and able
to realign itself with the state. In the case of ancient Greece, the increasing military
threat was may have been minor in many cases. The development of a powerful group
that wanted change in their interests probably played a more important role in this
case. The appearance of tyrants and their changes in political institutions was key to
the process of state formation. In exchange for support tyrants offered both property
rights and also political rights. But political power is also a form of ability to protect
one’s property rights.
5) Ancient Rome
This part of the paper has not been completed yet. It will highlight the reforms
in Rome on the eve of the Roman Republic.
42 Andrewes (1963), p. 49; Fine (1983), pp. 112–14; and Sealey (1976), pp. 54–8.
43 Andrewes (1963), p. 49; Fine (1983), pp. 108, 124–25; and Sealey (1976), p. 56.
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5) Conclusion
This paper compares the process of state formation in three different cases:
ancient China, Greece and Rome. As new states form in each case we see new
political institutions develop. Fundamental to these political institutions are the
relationships between the state and various groups in society. It is clear that as the
state enters new relations with a group an exchange takes place. The group offers
support to the state, usually in the form of taxes and/or services (commonly military
service), in exchange for an increase in their privileges and rights, most notably
property rights. In the case of ancient China it is clear that this exchange is one
involving support for property rights –usually land. In the cases of ancient Greece
and Rome, the exchanges involve support for political rights. However, in a
comparison of all three cases, we see that the common factor is property rights. This
is true since political rights can be used to expand one’s ability to use property, but the
reverse is not true in principle. Thus I conclude that at its most basic level, the state
extends property rights to new groups in exchange for support as states begin to form.
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